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The past 30 yea1·s the pace of agricultural growth in many low 
income countries (LICs) has been remarkable. While a few nations 
continue to have trouble feeding all their citizens when disaster 
strikes, and somP people lack access to sufficient calories, there 
are now fewer production dilemmas and more problems of inequitable 
distributions of purchasing power. Social scientists have 
contributed to this success by helping policy makers understand 
the importance of product and input prices, new production 
technology, education, and infrastructure in agricultural growth. 
Several important contributors to rural development, namely 
on-farm capital formatiou and rural financial markets, 
nevertheless, are still poorly understood. This is largely due to 
the difficulties of documenting their contributions to 
development. While highly visible government investments in 
agriculture are important, especially in relatively high income 
countries, progress in agriculture has often depended on capital 
formation that occurs outside the spotlight, done in small 
increments by individuals or by small groups of farmers. 
Likewise, rural financial intermediation is difficult to document 
because it is usually diffused and fragmented, includes a large 
number of participants, and involves procedures that are 
misunderstood. 
2 
In the following discussion I outlin~ research priorities on 
the topics of on-farm capital formation and rural financial 
markets. Before doing this, I clarify my use of the terms 
capital' and 'rural financial markets,' briefly describe the 
intersections between these markets and on-farm capital formation, 
and present terse summaries of recent research on these topics. 
Definitions 
There are few areas in economics that involve more 
ambiguities than capital, largely because of the elastic 
definitions employed. On occasions the term capital is applied to 
things as disparate as money, a category of productive inputs, 
education and experience, and social relationships. In the 
following discussion I restrict my use of the term to inputs that 
are not entirely expended in one production period and are man-
made, or grow only under husbandry. Examples include the terraced 
rice paddies and associated irrigation systems in many parts of 
Asia constructed with huge investments of human labor. Similar 
capital creation can be seen in Belize or Peru where colonists are 
attacking jungles with axe and fire to prepare land for crops or 
livestock. The extensive cattle herds of the Maasai in East 
Africa, water buffalo in Thailand, tea plantations in Sri Lanka, 
coca fields in Bolivia, fruit orchards in Chile, olive groves in 
Jordan, cocoa trees in Ghana, coconut plantations in Jamaica, 
rubber plantations in Malaysia, and coffee groves in Costa Rica 
are other examples of farm capital, mostly created by sweat-
equity. 
') ,, 
0 f y f' d !' s . thP muchetes wi1·ld1><l 
co1011isls, and •dclu<i fE•nces plauted by Mexlca11 farme1·s jllustr<1lE' 
thdt cdpitd1 m<1y c11n11: in ·~mall anrl, sometirnr>s, 1111gL1moro11s for·m'"' 
T a]so Pmploy a narl'ow definition when diF<'U!:n>ing rural 
finan1 i,ll mctrkets (RF'Ms). I use this term to denote tr<u1sn.ctinlls 
ill rural are<ls that jnvolve loans or d<'posits, dont' at least 
p<1rlly with financi<1l instruments. WhiJe my mn.in concern is with 
how formal aurl 1nf'nrma1 illtermf'riiarjPs help to facilitate finance, 
T am also intereste1l in how individual::, or small groups mobilize 
funds and make loans to eaC'h other without i11termeriiari.es. 
T make a c ,, ref ll 1 di st inc t i on he tween man - marl e cap i ta 1 and 
financial instrumt'llis (generalized claims 011 n>sourc<>s). In tl1p 
sensP I use the·,1~ terms, only capital contrih11te~:. directly to 
production. Fu 11 d s or f in an c i al i n s U· um 1 • 11 t s , j n t 11 r n , do no t en t e r 
production directly, but may be used to purchase capital or non·-
cap.ital inputs, held as assets, or convPrted inti. otlH~J' assets or 
consumption goods. It is important lo note that capital may pldy 
dual roles in a farm household; 11ot only aJ'P t.he8~' items g1·adua1 ly 
used up in production, but untiJ they are worn oul they art> also 
assets. It is only in thh; latter sensl' of being an asset that 
financial instruments and capital items are similar. 
Another way of distinguishing between capital and financial 
instruments is by the transactions costs involved in converting 
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ll H • m i n t o s o m E· t h i 11 g e 1 s e . T y p i c a 11 y , c h a n g i n g f i n a n c i a 1 
instruments into other forms involves few cost~- -low transactions 
costs are thP major reason for the invention of money. In 
con l r as t , the tr .1 n sac t i on s costs of con v er t i n e cap i la 1 i t ems i n to 
o t her forms a i· e t y pi ca 11 y re 1 a t j v" 1 y J al' g E' • A J so , th P d i v ere e 11 c e 
between salv<lge value of most capital items and their use value 
dpter decisions to covrrt capital ilAms into othrr goods or 
services. 
Intersections 
There arP major overlaps betwee11 on-farm capital formation 
and RFMs. Lti,ins al low farmers to p11r·chctsP lai-ge capital i terns 
sooner than they could have done if they l1ad to save sufficient 
funds to makP the pui-chase. Also, firmA that can borrow to cover 
part of their operating costs may realjze- higher incomes, that, i11 
turn, facilitate on-farm capital formatjon more rapidly than if 
loans were u11availahle. Deposit S(•rvices may also P.nhance capital 
formation by providing households places to store savings 
increments until the firm has enoueh money to purchasP a large 
capital item. Further, the ability to borrow may allow firms to 
undertake larger and more risky on farm invPstmrnts thau OIH"1·ators 
would deem prudent in the absence of credit reserves (Baker). 
On a mo1H aggregate scale, efficient fjnancial mark1•ts 
facilitate capital formation in rural areds through helping to 
a 1 Io cat E" resources mo re e ff i c i en t l y ; s u r p 1 us op(~ rat ors w h u e :qi<' ct 
low marginal rates of return to investments in their operalions 
can makP deposit~ with financial interm(•<iiaries, who, in turn, can 
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1t-'11 d t hes e funds t n i n div id u a 1 s who ex 1w ct hi g h r c turns f 1· om 
further jnvestm<>nts, lrnt have too little cash to act on these 
opp or t 11 n i t i es . The morE' efficif'Ht allocation of resources that 
result~ increases incomes of both saver and borrower and thus 
r->11hanc-es their ab] 1 it ies and incentives to make further 
investments. 
While financial markets play d significant role in on-farm 
capital formation where farmers buy and sell a large part of their 
inputs aud products, it is important to remember that self-finance 
often dominates on -farm capital formation. This i~ especially 
true when RFMs are rudimentary and where these markets are 
severely repressed. It is too often forgotten that humans have 
made immense investments in irrigation systems, clearing of land, 
in livestock, in terracing, in buildings, and in equipment without 
the assistance of fo1·mal financial systems and government credit 
programs. 
Before leaviHg this topic, it is useful to briefly critique a 
spurious intersPctiuu between farm capital and RFMs: the claim 
that a low interest rate on formal loans induces farmers to 
substitute capital (machinery) for labor. While often mentioned 
in development litPrature as the main adversE' effe>ct of cheap 
agricultural loans, on careful analysis this appears not to be the 
cas~ for two re~sons. 
First, most farmers in LICs operate in fragmpnted financial 
markets that have real interest rates on loans ranging from highly 
negative to highly positive. There is no a priori reason to 
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concludu that one of these interest rates--the concessionary rate 
charged on a formal loan--dictates the s11bjective discount rate 
applied by tl10 borrower to the future stream of benefits expPcted 
from an investment in machinery. (If this were true, it would 
imply that high interest rates cause farmers to substitute labor 
for capital). E v e n i f the r e we r e a o n e - t o -· o n e i· e l a t i o n s h i p 
between an interest rate on a loan and a borrowers' subjective 
discount rate, what discount rate would an indi~idual use who has 
two 1 o ans , one w i th a l ow int e i· es t rate a n d the o the r a high r a t e? 
One answer is that, in fragmented financial markets especially, 
interest rates 011 individual loans have no direct tie to a 
borrower's subjective discount rate. 
Second, fjna11ciaJ instruments arc highly fungible 
(interchangeable); a borrowed unit of currency is identical to one 
owned by the borrower. Further, almost all farmers in LICs have 
multiple sources and uses of liquidity. Thus, one should not 
conclude that marginal changes in use of borrowed liquidity are 
highly correlated with the justification given for the loan. Most 
borrowers have the option of exercising financial substitution, 
even if the intent of a loan is to buy machinery. Part of this 
substitution may involve hiring more labor. Given this, it js uot 
clear why a change in the price of one source of liquidity--the 
interest rate on a formal loan--would alter the relative 
desirability of two possible uses of liquidity: e.g .. purchasing 
machinery compared to hiring more labor. Interest rates have no 
direct effect on the marginal rPturns expected from labor or 
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capita] and, therf!foi·e, havt> little or no dJrect effect on factor 
use proportions by borrowers. 
If concessionary i11terest rates on formal loans affect 
factor-use proportions, it is more likely an indirect 
relationship. That is, low interest rates induce lenders to 
concentrate loans in the hands of borrowers who have the most 
secure collateral aud thosE' who impose lhe lowest transactions 
costs on the intermediary (Gonzalez-Vega). If these preferred 
b o r r owe r s hap fH' n t o u s P a h i g h e r r a t i o o f cap i t a l - t o - l ab or t ha n d o 
those potential borrowers rationed from the market by the low 
interest rates, the11 the overall ratio of capital-to-labor will 
increase. 
Research on Capital Formation 
Farm capital is difficult to analyze for at least five 
reasons. First, complications are encounteJ'ed because capital 
items are heterogeneous and difficult to value. This causes 
serjous aggregatton problems. What value does the researcher 
assign to a capital item that can only be sold for less than its 
acquisition price, but is worth more for production purposes than 
its salvage value? Second, some capital items such as housing and 
vehicles are used both for production and consumption. Third, 
some capital formation occurs in qualitative changes. How does a 
researcher measure and evaluate changes in soil productivity 
enhanced through drainage, fertility improvements, weed control 
programs, or removal of stones? How should changrs in human 
capital be measured when they occur largely through experience 
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gained from trial a11d Prror? Fourth, whPn is a capital item held 
by the farm operator because it is a desirable asset, rather than 
because of its direct contribution to production? And fifth, how 
can the researcher keep the costs of collecting data within 
reasonable bounds when farmers are often reticent--or unable -to 
reveal a complete inventory of their capital and assets, and when 
study of capital formation is best done with costly time series 
information or panel data? 
These problems have dissuaded most researchers, in both high 
as well as low income countries, from doing comprehensive studies 
of this topic. Exceptions to this are extensive farm surveys 
carried out by Brazilian and US academics during the early 1970s 
in Southern Brazil (Adams and others), a handful of case studies 
by anthropologists (e.g., Firth and Yamey), and interesting work 
by agricultural economists in Japan (e.g., Izumida). 
It has been more common for researchers to do partial 
analyses of single types of farm capital such as machinery, 
irrigations systems, human capital, livestock, perennial crops, 
buildings, and land quality changes. Also, it has been more 
common for researchers to do cross sectional studies and treat 
capital generation as an event, rather than to collect time series 
or panel data that would allow analysis of the process of capital 
formation. Because of the lack of data, researchers have often 
been forced to study the contribution of capital and technological 
change by looking at unexplained residuals. 
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Research Agenda on Capital Formation 
While thP makP up of farm level capital, how it evolves over 
time, and the contribu1 ions it makes to overall development are 
interesting intellectual questions, answering these questions 
exceeds the patience and resources available to most researchers, 
especially in LICs. Researchers will be forced to continue to 
limit their analysis in this area to partial studies that are most 
interesting to policy makers. If it is important to demonstrate 
that substantial amounts of on-farm capital formation occur, and 
to show that it makes an important contribution to development, 
representative case studies may be more realistic research tools 
than are large surveys. While not satisfying intellectually, 
those who are interested in the overall process of on-farm capital 
formation must accept this process as largely taking place in a 
black box. 
Instead of attempting to measure on-farm capital formation or 
to document its contribution to development, researchers will be 
forced to focus on how to speed investments in particular capital 
items and assessing whether it is desirable to do so. This will 
1nc:lude documenting the impact of important economic policies on 
these investments. The bulk of the research, therefore, will be 
on some particular capital form and on particular conditions or 
policies that affect these investments by farmers. 
The capital forms that receive priority in a given country 
will be highly time and place specific. For example, in the late 
1960s and early 1970s tubewell irrigation in many parts of South 
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Asia was an important part of capital formation and merited 
substantial research. In contrast, in the late 1980s the Peoples' 
Republic of China was making major decisions on farm 
mechanization, considerations that could have benefited from 
systematic analysis. Still other countries such as Haiti, many 
nations in Africa, and Nepal need to encourage more on-farm 
investments to slow the ravages of erosion; research might provide 
assistance in making these decisions. 
Because of the possibilities of labor substitution as well as 
complementarities, farm machinery will likely be a high priority 
research item in many LICs. It is also clear that improvement in, 
and extension of, irrigation systems will be necessary to s11stain 
growth in agricultural output in many countries. Likewise, 
investments in conservation practices will be necessary in almost 
all LICs if our generation is to pass on to the next land and 
water resources that sustain rather than hobble development. Many 
farmers will also need to expand their livestock herds, plant more 
tree crops, and learn modern farming practices if those who people 
the 21st Century are to be fed and clothed bettor than those of 
the 20th Century. 
It is easier to identify the conditions and policies that 
merit research priority when it comes to stimulating on-farm 
capital formation. On a broad scale it is largely the ability and 
willingness of farmers to make farm investments that determine the 
pace of farm level capital formation. Ability to invest is 
strongly influenced by farmers' income, ability to borrow funds or 
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resources, and education and experience. The willingness to 
invest, in turn, is largely conditioned by the returns farmers 
expect from additional investments in on-farm capital. Expected 
prices of products and inputs, yield expectations, risk 
considerations, and subjective discount rates applied to the 
expected benefits from the investment are additional 
considerations. Insecure land title and tenure can also have a 
major impact on the willingness of farm operators to make 
investments. 
attention. 
Where this is a problem it merits special research 
As suggested earlier, RFMs facilitate on-farm capital 
formation and in many countries credit projects are the major 
instrument used by governments and donors to stimulate investments 
in machinery, tree crops, livestock, irrigation, conservation, 
buildings, and even education. Credit projects are frequently 
accompanied by sizeable subsidies through concessionary interest 
rates, capital grants, toleration of loan defaults, and free 
training. Recent research has shown that many of these projects 
have not worked as intended, that formal RFMs are not efficient, 
and that they are distributing their services and subsidies 
inequitably. It has become increasingly clear that RFMs can only 
bolster development in general, and on-farm capital formation in 
particular, if they operate more efficiently and equitably, a 
subject to which I now turn. 
12 
Research on RFMs 
RFMs in low income countries have increasingly drawn the 
attention of researchers, especially since the late 1960s. 
prior to that, a few substantial studies were done on the 
Even 
structure of rural credit markets, especially in Asia. Increased 
RFM research resulted from large government- and donor-sponsored 
farm credit programs initiated during the 1960s-1970s, attempts to 
create new farm credit organizations, and from efforts to 
substitute formal loans for informal borrowing. In some 
countries, farm loans became the main tool for promoting rural 
development. These programs were usually targeted at accelerating 
the use of modern technology and increasing on-capital formation. 
Much of the research associated with these efforts was either in 
the form of credit-impact studies aimed at documenting borrowers' 
benefits from expanded loan use, or studies to uncover 
exploitation by informal lenders. 
By the early 1970s it become clear that many of these credit 
programs had serious problems and that much of the research done 
was of limited use in forming solutions. This was documented in a 
worldwide review of small farmer credit programs conducted by the 
Agency for International Development during 1972-73 (Donald), and 
reinforced by an FAO sponsored conference in Rome on agricultural 
credit in 1975. Major problems included extensive loan defaults, 
concentration of concessionary priced loans in the hands of 
borrowers who were relatively well off, few rural people with 
access to formal financial services, credit programs that were not 
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self sustaining, few deposits mobilized in rural areas, and 
growing doubts about how effective loans were in stimulating 
investments and output. 
During th~ 1970s research on RFMs began to evolve from 
credit-impact studies and attempts to document exploitation by 
informal lenders, to paying more attention to the overall 
performance of RFMs, positive aspects of informal finance, and 
deposit mobilization. This involved a change in the focus of 
research from what farmers did with additional funds provided by a 
loan, to understanding the behavior and services provided by 
financial intermediaries. These research trends continued during 
the 1980s, but additional stress was also placed on the 
transactions costs involved in various aspects of rural financial 
intermediation. 
RFM Research Agenda 
Policy makers and researchers who specialize in RFMs have 
somewhat different concerns. The policy maker tends to worry 
about immediate problems; while interests of researchers are 
longer run, more basic in nature, and revolve around understanding 
how RFMs work. A research agenda that addresses some of the 
policy makers concerns (so they will fund the research), and, at 
the same time, also furthers the interests of researchers might be 
done best through the use of a research matrix. 
Because financial markets are interwoven, it is important 
that this matrix reflect the most important aspects of these 
markets, of which there are at least three. The first dimension 
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is made up of the three layers of participants in RFMs: individual 
borrowers and savers, financial intermediaries, and policy makers. 
The second dimension divides financial activities into those 
carried out by formal intermediaries (regulated) and those 
conducted in informal markets (unregulated). The third dimension 
further subdivides the above into loan and deposit issues. 
This matrix recognizes the intimate relationship between 
policy, intermediary behavior, and financial services. Likewise, 
it acknowledge that formal and informal finance are entwined, and 
that deposits and loans are often mirror images of each other. 
The matrix also encourages researchers to view RFMs as linked 
parts, rather than as a series of independent credit projects. It 
further highlight the importance of considering deposit 
mobilization along with lending. 
Placing previous research into this matrix allows 
identification of gaps in analysis. For example, prior to 1970 
most RFM research focused on the borrower-saver dimension, with 
some analysis on intermediaries, but largely ignored deposits. 
During the 1970s more research emphasis was given to the policy 
making dimension and to deposits. In the 1980s informal finance 
and research on intermediary behavior and performance has receive 
much more attention, along with study of the performance of the 
overall system. 
RFM problems and policies in many LICs are surprisingly 
similar. This results in a relatively small number of research 
issues that are of interest to a large number of policy makers as 
J 5 
well as researchers. Five candidates for this list are: ( 1 ) 
Documenting the transactions costs involved in RFMs and their 
distribution among the participants in these markets. This 
includes studying how new financial technologies and changes in 
policies affect these costs. (2) Explaining why some rural people 
have access to formal loans and deposits while others do not. (3) 
Understanding what caus~s formal loan recovery problems. (4) 
Studying how deposit mobilization affects the performance of RFMs. 
And, (5) analyzing the financial services provided by various 
forms of informal finance in order to design more desirable formal 
financial systems. A few additional comments on each of these 
topics may show why they are likely to be of interest to both 
policy makers and researchers. 
Transactions costs show the amount of financial friction in 
RFMs and are, perhaps, the best measure of the overall efficiency 
of a financial system. Studying the allocation of these costs 
among participants also provides insights into how financial 
services are rationed. Currently, some students of RFMs are 
arguing that major reductions In these costs will be necessary 
before formal financial markets can service--on a sustained basis-
-many of the rural people who now do not have access to formal 
loans or deposit accounts. Systematic study of transactions costs 
can give policy makers and managers of financial institutions 
useful insights into the costs of their program and projects, and 
at the same time, allow researchers to gain fundamental insights 
into the operations of RFMs. Transactions costs for a doctor of 
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financial systems are analogous to the blood pressure taken by a 
physician as a measure of a person's health. Each measure tells a 
lot about the general health of a patient, be they a person or an 
RFM. 
The proportion of rural individuals and firms who can borrow 
from, or deposit surpluses in, a formal institution is an 
excellent proxy for the extent to which RFMs assist in allocating 
resources efficiently. A repressed or underdeveloped financial 
system reaches only a few of the individuals who can productively 
use formal loans. A severely repressed financial system does a 
particularly poor job of connectjng surplus households and firms 
to a system that facilitates resource reallocation. Increasing 
the number of rural people, especially th~ poor, who have access 
to formal loans is a primary policy objective in many LICs. 
Clarifying why financial markets are slow to embrace new customers 
in rural areas provides fundamental insights into how these 
markets operate and also has important short-run policy 
implications. 
Defaults on agricultural loans made from government or donor 
funds are a major concern of policy makers in a number of LICs. 
Chronic defaults drain government budgets and also undermine the 
ability to sustain government sponsored credit programs. In a 
fundamental sense, loan recovery reflects the quality of the 
relationships between borrowers and lenders. Chronic recovery 
problems indicate an inability on the part of the lender to verify 
creditworthiness, that politics are heavily involved, or that 
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borrowers find their rPlationships with lenders are unsatisfactory 
and decide to seek a "divorce" through the expediency of default. 
Even worse, defaults destroy one of thP most important products of 
financial intermediation: sustained working relationships between 
borrowers and intermediaries. 
The past few years an increasing number of governments have 
been unable to sustain previous levels of funding for agricultural 
credit programs. This problem has been reinforced by the 
declining willingness of donors to provide loans for government 
credit efforts. This has forced some government institutions lo 
place more emphasis on mobilizing deposits in rural areas. At the 
same time, a few researchers have been arguing that RFMs would 
operate more efficiently and equitably if their deposit-to-loan 
ratios were increased substantially. This ratio shows the extent 
to which RFMs are self funded, or conversely, the extend to which 
they are dependent on outside funds. Outside funds may impose 
substantial additional costs on RFMs, open them to political 
intrusions, and seduce them into ignoring deposits. RFMs that 
have high loan-to-deposit ratios appear to perform better with 
respect to transactions costs, loan recovery, and proportion of 
rural population serviced than do those systems with low ratios. 
As suggested earlier, policy makers have traditionally been 
interested in informal finance only in a perverse way of seeklng 
its demise, particularly in South Asia. Recent research, however, 
is suggesting that some forms of informal fjnance in rural areas 
provide financial services efficiently. Also, some rural people, 
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especially the poor, find that informal financial services are 
more valuable to them than are government sponsored programs. The 
popularity of informal finance in rural arPas and high rates of 
loan recovery in these systems are signs of this. Analysis of 
informal finance can provide valuable information on the types of 
financial services that many people are demanding, along with 
insights into arrangements and technologies that people informally 
develop to keep the costs low of providing these services. 
Concluding Comments 
Farm level capital formation and rural financial markets in 
LICs are some of the most difficult research topics that social 
scientists treat. Both processes occur over wide geographic 
areas, include a large number of participants, and involve 
activities that are costly and tedious to substantiate. These 
research problems are exacerbated by fuzzy thinking about what 
capital is and what financial markets do. While these two sets of 
activities do intersect, they are vastly different processes and 
ought to be treated tha~ way by researchers. 
It will be extremely difficult to document the overall 
contribution of farm-level capital formation to development. In 
addition, few policy makers are willing to pay for this type of 
research. Those who are interested in this process must gain 
insights into it through case studies and through analyses of 
those types of capital that policy makers are attempting to 
promote. 
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Opportunities for doing useful research on RFMs are more 
promising. Additional analysis should focus on understanding why 
RFMs operate inefficiently and also limit their services to such a 
small part of the population. Because politics is often involved 
in credit programs, those doing RFM research must be sensitive to 
the risks and opportunities this entails. 
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